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Abstract: 
We study the nature of judicial bias in bankruptcy proceedings following the enactment of 
bankruptcy law in Russia in 1998. We find that regional political characteristics affected judicial 
decisions about the numbers and types of bankruptcy procedures initiated after the law took effect. 
In particular, controlling for indicators of firms’ insolvency and the quality of the regional judiciary, 
reorganization procedures were significantly more frequent in regions with politically popular 
governors and governors who had hostile relations with the federal government. Poor judicial 
quality was also associated with higher incidence of reorganizations. In addition, the quality of the 
regional judiciary affected performance of firms in reorganization procedure: in regions with poor 
judicial quality firms in reorganization significantly underperformed firms not in bankruptcy; while 
the opposite was true in regions with high-quality judges. The effect of judicial quality on 
restructuring is particularly strong in regions with politically popular governors because the judicial 
bias in governor’s favor is the highest in poor-quality courts when governors are popular. This 
evidence is consistent with previously reported anecdotes, which suggested that politically strong 
regional governors used bankruptcy proceedings to protect firms from paying federal taxes. 
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1. Introduction 
Laws and regulations that perfectly fit into a well-developed market economy might bring 
unexpected outcomes when transplanted to an emerging market. The performance of legal rules 
depends upon the environment in which they are applied. Enforcement and application of legal rules 
can be subverted by powerful actors who have political influence over law enforcers (Glaeser, 
Scheinkman, and Shleifer, 2003). In addition, law enforcers themselves may have their own career 
concerns or preferences for fairness and social justice that dictate them to apply the law 
differentially (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2005). Enactment of Russia’s 1998 Bankruptcy Law provides 
a natural experiment for studying mechanisms behind poor law enforcement. Prior to the enactment 
of the law, there was virtually no bankruptcy institution. As a result, many firms had accumulated 
tax arrears and overdue debts and were candidates for bankruptcy after the enactment of the 1998 
law. Only a very small fraction of them actually went bankrupt. Selective application of the law 
allows us to study the biases in law enforcement.1 The results help drawing general lessons on how 
to transplant legal rules and design them from scratch in emerging markets. 
The main goals of Russia's 1998 Bankruptcy Law were to restructure loss-making enterprises 
or close them down (if restructuring was not possible) and to provide creditors with an effective tool 
of debt recovery. In 1997, the share of loss-making enterprises in Russia was about 50%, and total 
overdue loans and taxes amounted to 30% of GDP, of which overdue tax liabilities to the 
consolidated budget were about 7% of GDP (Goskomstat, 1999). The Law had been drafted 
according to up-to-date academic standards (e.g., EBRD, 2000a, 2000b; Black and Kraakman, 1996; 
La Porta et al., 1998). EBRD (2000b) stated:  
“If applied, consistently within the language of the law, the Russian [insolvency] 
system may result in the same or greater recovery for a secured creditor than results from 
many Western systems. …it could be argued that the Russian bankruptcy system adequately 
addresses the creditors' bargain and common pool issues…”2  
Yet, the law failed to achieve the intended goals: after its enactment, recovery rates remained low 
and restructuring was going very slowly. According to Goskomstat (2001), even after the full 
recovery from the 1998 crisis the share of Russian loss-making enterprises in 2000 was above 37% 
                                                 
1 Berglof, Rosenthal, and von Thadden (2001) note that "the most striking feature of Russian bankruptcy law, and of 
Russian corporate law in general, is the enormous discrepancy between laws on the book and the laws as they are 
enforced" (see also Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, 2000). 
2 In addition, Michelle Camdesus, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, stated in his address at the 
U.S.-Russia Business Council on April 1, 1998: "A new bankruptcy law entered into effect on March 1 which – though 
not perfect – should provide a powerful tool for enforcing tax compliance and hard budget constraints." 
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and bankruptcy was initiated against no more than 2% of insolvent firms. The World Bank reports 
that recovery rates remained below 50% in 2004 (Doing Business, World Bank, 2005). 
Using firm-level data on the application of the law, we test a hypothesis suggested by 
voluminous anecdotal evidence that the driving force behind the law’s poor enforcement was its 
subversion by regional governors – the second tier in the three-tiered federalist system in Russia. We 
find systematic evidence that regional governors had significant influence over law enforcers. In 
particular, the political strength of regional governors and their relationship with the federal 
authorities was a major determinant of the number and type of bankruptcy proceedings initiated by 
regional commercial courts after the enactment of the 1998 Bankruptcy Law.  
The fact that the governors managed to affect outcomes of bankruptcy proceedings is an 
interesting and, to some extent, unexpected finding. Regional governors were competing for 
influence over law enforcers with a wealthy and powerful coalition of Moscow-based banks owned 
by Russian “oligarchs” and the federal government who were the major creditors of Russian firms at 
the time. The federal government was primarily concerned with collecting federal tax arrears; 
whereas the oligarchic banks were interested in gaining control over non-paying enterprises in 
addition to simple debt recovery. In contrast, regional governors, often in coalition with incumbent 
managers of firms, were interested in keeping financial resources and control over assets in their 
own hands. The oligarchs had substantially more resources to bribe law enforces compared to the 
regional governors or incumbent managers. The federal government, had it been politically strong, 
would have had means of influence both over the regional governors and judges. Nonetheless, 
anecdotal evidence (e.g., Black et al., 2000, Moss, 2000, and Volkov, 2004) suggests that the 
regional governors’ political control over the judiciary allowed them to leave the federal government 
and oligarchs empty-handed.3  
In a sociological study, Volkov (2004) describes the mechanism of subversion of the 1998 
Bankruptcy Law and illustrates it with a few examples: The reorganization procedure was used by 
governors in order to protect firms from paying federal taxes and repaying debt to Moscow-based 
banks. The automatic stay on assets provision of the bankruptcy law was used to freeze their claims, 
and firms continued their usual operations, while being formally under protection provided by the 
reorganization procedure. In many cases, the incumbent managerial team remained in control over 
the firms under reorganization: formally, the top manager was replaced by his/her closest ally. This 
                                                 
3 Federal tax arrears were growing throughout the 1990s. In the beginning of 1998, they reached 5% of Russia’s GDP. 
Cai and Treisman (2004), Sonin (2003), and Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2004) discuss theory and evidence of 
regional governors’ protection of firms from paying federal taxes. Shleifer and Treisman (2000) discuss the reasons and 
the consequences of federal government’s political weakness. 
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was contrary to the law prescription, which postulated that incumbent managers should be deprived 
of control over the firm and a bankruptcy practitioner should be appointed to run the firm on 
creditors’ approval. Sometimes, the incumbent management team was replaced by managers who 
had closer ties with the regional governor. Presumably, this happened when the incumbent managers 
and the governors could not agree on the terms of sharing the rents from expropriation of creditors 
and the federal budget. In addition, in some circumstances judges had the power to prolong 
reorganization proceedings for the so-called “socially important” enterprises up to 10 years. This 
clause of the law was often used to maintain the status quo for years so that managers with close ties 
to regional governors could stay in control, while the federal government and the Moscow-based 
banks could not recover their claims. Irrespective of what happened to the incumbent management, 
the bias of bankruptcy court judges towards regional political powers undermined the idea of 
bankruptcy as an institution that protects creditor rights. 
Why commercial courts may depend on regional authorities? There is no single systematic 
study of the incentives of commercial court judges. Presumably, there are two underlying reasons 
for the judicial bias. First, judges depend on regional authorities in their career prospects: after 
retiring from service in commercial courts, they often continue to work in regional administrations 
and regional state enterprises as lawyers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is virtually no inter-
regional or vertical mobility among the lowest-tier commercial judiciary. Moreover, appointments 
of regional judges require approval of regional authorities. Second, the political and geographical 
distance from the federal center forces judges to adhere to the regions socially.  
The best-known example of dependence of commercial court judges on regional political 
elites was the bankruptcy proceedings of the oil holding Sidanko and its key subsidiaries 
Chernogoneft and Kondopetroleum in 1999. During Chernogoneft bankruptcy proceedings, 98% of 
the creditors voted for a certain bankruptcy practitioner, but the judge overruled their decision and 
appointed a different candidate connected to another oil company, Tyumen Oil. The court also 
rejected the offer by Chernogoneft, already in bankruptcy, to pay all creditors in full. Incidentally, 
the Tyumenskaya Oblast Governor, Leonid Roketsky, happened to be the Chairman of the Board at 
Tyumen Oil. The latter bought Chernogoneft for $176 million and Kondpetroleum for $52 million (a 
small fraction of the actual market value). Black, Kraakman, and Tarasova (2000) wrote: "…  
Apparently, […] Tyumen Oil didn't merely bribe judges (Sidanko could have offered its own bribes), 
but threatened them as well…" The Economist (Dec. 4, 1999) wrote that according to allegations of 
one of the competitors to Tyumen Oil's, the company intimidated judges; in addition, Sidanko 
complained that: "If they just stuck to bribing judges, we could play that game too."  
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The evidence is not confined to the Tymen oblast. The so-called Governor's Off-budget 
Fund, formed in 1997 in Kemerovskaya oblast, provides another example of well-established 
political ties between regional governors and large firms, on the one hand, and commercial court 
judges, on the other. According to a national Russian daily Izvestia (September 16, 1999), a deeply-
troubled West-Siberian Metallurgy Kombinat (ZapSib, Kemerovo's biggest steel plant) despite being 
in the middle of bankruptcy proceedings, regularly contributed to the governor’s Fund with the 
consent of the judge, while accumulating large federal tax arrears. Such contributions are a direct 
violation of the law. Under the governor-controlled reorganization procedure, the company debts 
increased to about $400 million from $130 million (New York Times, 2000).4 
In this paper, we provide systematic evidence that the application of the law was, indeed, 
biased in favor of regional authorities. Our empirical strategy is twofold. First, we look at how the 
initial (i.e., taken before the enactment of the new law) regional factors influenced the probability of 
a firm to fall into either the reorganization or the liquidation proceedings after the enactment of the 
law, holding the level of firms’ financial health constant. We find that reorganization procedures 
were more frequently initiated against firms in regions with politically strong governors (who 
exercised control over courts more easily) and in regions with a higher degree of political 
independence from the federal center (which made it less politically costly for the governors to 
expropriate federal tax revenues). In contrast, liquidation procedures were less frequently initiated 
against firms in regions with high degree of political independence from the federal center.  
Second, we test whether firms that found themselves in reorganization procedures after the 
enactment of the law restructured, as dictated by the law, or did not, as the story of bankruptcy 
subversion by regional governors would suggest. We find that in regions with a particularly bad 
quality of the regional judiciary (due both to low skills and regional bias of judges), firms in 
reorganization demonstrated significantly lower growth rates in sales, labor productivity, and 
product varieties compared to similar firms not in bankruptcy. In contrast, in regions with high-
quality judges, the opposite was true: firms in reorganization outperformed firms outside bankruptcy 
in terms of growth indicators. The effect of poor judicial quality on performance is stronger in 
regions with politically popular governors because in these regions the bias in governor’s favor in 
poor-quality courts is the greatest. These findings are consistent with the view that politically strong 
governors subverted enforcement of the bankruptcy law in Russia.  
                                                 
4 “Using Bankruptcy As a Takeover Tool: Russian Law Puts Healthy Companies at Risk,” New York Times, October 7, 
2000. 
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By analyzing the consequences of a legal transplant to a weakly institutionalized 
environment, our paper contributes to the literature on legal transplants (i.e., Berkowitz, Pistor, and 
Richard, 2003a, 2003b; and Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, 2000). We also contribute to the literature on 
comparative bankruptcy law by analyzing workings of the law enforcement in different institutional 
environments (see, for instance, Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992; Hart, 2000; Bolton, 2002; Ayotte 
and Yun, 2003; Povel, 1999; World Bank, 2004, 2005; Berkovitch and Israel, 1999; Claessens and 
Klapper, 2005; Djankov, McLiesh, Shleifer, 2006). Our findings also have relevance to the literature 
on Russia's federalism (Qian and Weingast, 1997, Shleifer and Treisman, 2000, Sonin, 2003, Cai 
and Treisman, 2004, Zhuravskaya, 2000, Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 2004), since we document 
that the bankruptcy institution is used by regional governments as a mechanism for redistributing tax 
revenue from the federal center to the regions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes institutional background 
and presents details of the bankruptcy legislation and basic statistics. Section 3 describes the results 
of econometric analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background 
2.1. Commercial courts 
In Russia, bankruptcy cases are decided by commercial (“Arbitrazh”) courts. In 1991, Russia 
entered economic transition with “Gosarbitrazh”, a state judicial organ. Gosarbitrazh decided cases 
primarily based on either the current considerations of fulfillment of five-year plans, or direct 
political orders; whereas law did not enter into consideration (Hendley, 1999). In 1991, judicial 
reform established commercial courts as a state tribunal charged with resolving business disputes. 
Since 1995, Russian commercial courts have been organized in three-tier system. There are 81 
courts of first instance (i.e., regional courts), ten appellate courts, and one Higher Arbitrazh Court, 
which is the commercial court of last instance.  
The most commonly considered cases by commercial courts are contractual disputes, tax 
disputes between firms and federal government, disputes over ownership of property, use of land, 
antitrust, environmental and customs regulation, as well as over registration, licensing and 
certification. The next most common type of cases considered in commercial courts is bankruptcy 
proceedings. (See Hendley, 1999, for a detailed information on the dynamics of caseload.) 
It is important for our story that the law requires the plaintiff to file a suit in the commercial 
court of the first jurisdiction (regional court) of the region, where the defendant is officially 
registered. This prevents competition between different regional courts (see, for instance, Shvets, 
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2005). Jurisdictions of each of the regional courts coincides with the administrative borders of their 
respective regions. The ties between regional judges and regional authorities in many regional courts 
have been very strong throughout the second half of 1990s. First, since 1995, judicial appointments 
required consent of regional authorities.  Formally, all nominations to the positions of judges in 
regional commercial courts (done by the qualifying committee of judges) are approved by the 
regional legislative assembly, which in many regions is under political control of the governor, i.e., 
the top regional executive. 
The law requires commercial courts be financed only from the federal budget. Nonetheless, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the lack of federal financing lead to a common situation, in which 
regional governments covered a large part of courts expenses from the regional budgets and even 
supplemented judges’ salaries. 
There is no agreement in the literature on the quality of Russian commercial courts. Hendley, 
Murrell, and Ryterman (2001) survey Russian entrepreneurs to find that commercial court judges are 
regarded as having high ethical standards; they conclude that the commercial court system is less 
corrupt relative to other institutions in Russia. (In their survey, there were no questions on the 
integrity of judges in bankruptcy proceedings, however.) In addition, Hendley (1999) argues that 
there are relatively small delays in commercial court hearings. In contrast, Black and Tarasova 
(2000) make a case that commercial courts in Russia are very corrupt and have almost no experience 
in dealing with complicated business cases. Black and Kraakman (1996) and Hay and Shleifer 
(1998) discuss evidence of frequent severe delays in court hearings. 
2.2. Bankruptcy legislation 
Russia has had the bankruptcy legislation since November 1992. (Although the first Russia's 
bankruptcy regulation was adopted in 1740, there were no bankruptcy institution during the last five 
decades of the Soviet regime.) The 1992 bankruptcy law was completely ineffective: between 1992 
and 1998, very few companies went bankrupt. The failure of this law to bring about financial 
discipline was due to the limited scope of its application and excessively complicated procedures. In 
order to initiate a bankruptcy procedure according the 1992 law, the total amount of outstanding 
debt had to exceed the total book value of a company's assets. In practice, a company manager could 
simply issue worthless debt to his own firm at a high face value to avoid bankruptcy. Thus, for 
Russia's companies, courts, and tax collectors, there was no operational bankruptcy legislation in 
Russia before 1998. 
The law of 1998 was supposed to amalgamate best parts of the U.S. and UK Bankruptcy 
Codes and make the initiation of bankruptcy very easy. Formally, under the 1998 law, if a creditor 
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filed a bankruptcy petition, the following procedure was undertaken. First, a temporary manager, 
appointed by a bankruptcy court judge, collected information about the claims on the company and 
organized a creditor meeting. At the meeting, the creditors decided if they wanted liquidation or 
reorganization. Second, the judge made a ruling on the liquidation or reorganization of the company, 
taking into consideration the resolution of the creditor meeting. The judge appointed a “liquidation 
manager” if a liquidation was ordered, or an “external manager” if a reorganization was ordered. 
The judge did not necessarily need to follow the creditors’ request. This clause in the law was 
motivated by the fact that creditors may opt for an inefficient liquidation. Initiation of both 
procedures was supposed to deprive the incumbent management of control over the firm.  
Thus, the main features of the 1998 law were (i) the dismissal of management upon filing, 
aimed at hardening budget constraints for managers, and (ii) the judicial discretion to mitigate 
creditors' tendency to over-liquidate, in case survival is socially efficient. These two features were in 
contrast with the U.S. bankruptcy law, which emphasized debtor-in-possession but offers judges 
fewer opportunities to mandate reorganization than the Russian law. The reorganization procedure 
according to the 1998 the Russian bankruptcy law was much harsher on the incumbent management 
compared to Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy law and less creditor-friendly than the U.K.’s 
reorganization procedure, which allowed creditors’ full control. 
In December 2002, a new bankruptcy law was adopted. Although changes introduced by the 
new law aimed at reducing an outright fraud frequent under the 1998 law, most features important 
for our story remained intact (see Thompson, 2002, for an overview of main changes).  
 2.3. Basic bankruptcy statistics 
The Russian 1998 law was expected to vastly improve managerial incentives because it was 
supposed to be harsh on the incumbent management. This was in drastic contrast to legislation in 
place prior to 1998. The result should have been an improvement of creditor protection, and thus, 
ex-ante efficiency, which is considered crucial for financial development (e.g., von Thadden, 
Berglof, and Roland 2003, La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2000). The hope was that the law would boost 
development of private credit institutions. In terms of private credit to GDP ratio, Russia was on 84th 
place out of 129 countries (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2006). Indeed, since the law was 
adopted, the bank credit as percentage of GDP increased as shown in Figure 1 and so did the number 
of initiated bankruptcy procedures, as shown in Table 1. These two facts were often interpreted by 
policymakers as hard evidence of an overall success of the bankruptcy reform. Such interpretations, 
however, may be misleading. One has to be very careful in drawing welfare conclusions from these 
facts. First, an increase in (private) credit can be a consequence of soft budget constraints (Maskin 
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and Xu, 2001), rather than an indication of improvement in ex-ante efficiency. This is particularly 
likely in transition economies. For instance, this is the reason why private credit to GDP ratio in 
China is above that in many financially developed countries, e.g. Germany and France (Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2006). Second, bankruptcy procedures were initiated primarily against fly-
by-night firms that had been created primarily for tax evasion purposes and disappeared shortly after 
registration, while the vast majority of loss-making firms continued to operate, unaffected by 
bankruptcy. (The 1998 law had no special procedure for the liquidation of an absent debtor.) 
Analysis in this paper shows that the law had different effect in different regions depending on the 
quality of the regional judiciary and political strength of regional governors. 
Table 2 summarizes basic firm-level characteristics in 1997 for three groups of firms: 1) all 
firms, 2) firms that fell into reorganization procedure in 1998, and 3) firms that fell into liquidation 
procedure in 1998.  The three groups differ both in the average size of firms and average basic 
performance characteristics, such as labor productivity, labor productivity growth and profitability. 
As one would expect, firms under liquidation were the worst performers, on average, whereas firms 
unaffected by bankruptcy procedures were the best. The most noticeable difference among the three 
groups is the firms’ size. Liquidation procedures were initiated primarily against small and medium-
size enterprises. In contrast, reorganization procedures were initiated against much larger 
enterprises. On average, sales of firms under reorganization were fifteen times larger compared to 
sales of firms that entered a liquidation procedure; and the difference in the number of employees 
was fourfold. Political economy literature explains why politicians may be opposed to liquidation of 
large companies and why there can be too few liquidation procedures (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996, Tornell, 2001, Kornai, Maskin, and Roland, 2003).  
Thus, it is not surprising that small firms were liquidated, while large firms were reorganized after 
the new law took effect. In this paper, we show that preferences for the choice of liquidation and 
reorganization diverged in the federal and regional governments in Russia.  
 
3. Analysis 
3.1. Data 
We compiled data from the following sources: the list of publicly announced reorganization 
procedures initiated in 1998 and the first half of 1999 comes from the “Internet Securities” 
(www.securities.ru) and the AK&M news service (www.disclosure.ru) data bases; a comprehensive 
list of liquidation procedures initiated in 1998 and the first half of 1999 comes from the Higher 
Bankruptcy Court Journal (Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda); data on firms in 1996-1999 
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were obtained from the Russian Enterprise Registry Longitudinal Database (RERLD, the annual 
census of large and medium-size industrial enterprises); firm-level financial data come from the 
ALBA data set of balance sheets for large Russian industrial firms; regional statistical data come 
from statistical abstracts Regions of Russia, 1999, the official web site of the Russia's State Tax 
Agency, MFK Renaissance, Central Elections Commission of RF, and Shvets (2005).5  
 
3.2. Did regional political characteristics influence the type of bankruptcy procedures? 
Our main hypothesis is that regional courts are biased in favor of the regional governors.  
The two alternatives that we consider are as follows: commercial court judges are either unbiased in 
their decisions, or they are biased against regional governors in favor of the federal government and 
Moscow-based banks (i.e. firms’ main creditors). These three alternative hypotheses about the 
biases of the regional judiciary generate different predictions for the firms’ likelihood of going into 
reorganization or liquidation.  We focus on how the ex ante characteristics of the firms, their 
industries, and regions (before the 1998 law was adopted) influenced the odds that these firms ended 
up in either reorganization or liquidation procedure, or were not affected by either procedure. In 
particular, we are interested in whether regional political variables affect the probability of a 
bankruptcy procedure in a firm controlling for its financial health. We consider the following three 
main regional-level explanatory variables. 
(1) Governor’s popularity 
If judges potentially consider the regional governor’s opinion in their rulings, one would 
expect that the bias towards governors would be stronger for more popular and, thus, politically 
strong governors than for less popular and, thus, politically weak governors. We use the share of the 
votes received by the governor in the first round of the latest regional election prior to the enactment 
of the 1998 bankruptcy law as a proxy for the governor’s popularity (we denote this variable as P). 
If the regional governors influence court decisions and use reorganization procedure as the tool to 
protect firms from paying federal taxes and debts (as much of anecdotal evidence suggests), one 
should expect to see more reorganizations in regions with more popular governors. In addition, since 
liquidations are politically costly, we expect to see fewer liquidation procedures when governors are 
                                                 
5 Available information on bankruptcies in Russia is very limited: we only have access to the lists of firms against which 
bankruptcy procedures were initiated in 1998 and the first half of 1999. We merge this information to firm-level and 
regional-level data from other sources. Unfortunately, there are no micro data on who initiated bankruptcy procedures or 
what the receipts of any of the claim holders were. Therefore, it is important to keep the data limitations in mind during 
the following discussion of the tests we perform. 
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popular. If courts are independent or biased toward creditors, the political strength of the governor 
should not matter for the numbers or types of bankruptcies. 
(2) Federal-regional hostility  
Both the federal and the regional authorities may potentially have preference towards 
reorganization over liquidation simply because politicians prefer not to close down firms for 
political reasons. Yet, if the hypothesis of the regional subversion of the bankruptcy institution is 
true, there is a direct conflict between regional and federal authorities in which the regional 
government uses reorganizations to freeze out federal tax claims. Thus, we would expect the 
governors that were in open political opposition to the federal center to be more active in using 
bankruptcy as a mechanism of expropriation of the federal center. More hostility in the relationship 
of the governor and the federal center implies lower political costs of opposition to the center in 
general, and in bankruptcy proceedings in particular. Thus, if courts are biased in favor of regional 
governors, we would expect reorganizations to be more likely when political relationship between 
the president and the governor are strained. Moreover, as the federal government is fiscally 
motivated, we would expect liquidations to be more likely when regional and federal governments 
are friendly to each other compared to a situation when they are at odds with each other and the 
courts are biased in favor of regional governors. We use an index constructed by MFK Renaissance, 
H, to measure how hostile the political relationships of the governor and the federal government 
were in 1997 (larger values mean more hostility). This index uses information on 1) the frequency of 
public statements by the governor against the policies of the federal center, 2) the extent to which 
regional laws and regulations violate federal laws, 3) the level of support to the governor by the 
president at the latest regional election, and 4) the presence of a bilateral treaty between the region 
and the center. 
(3) Judicial Quality 
We also use a measure of regional judicial quality (J) as one of our main explanatory 
variables. The measure was constructed and used by Shvets (2005). It is equal to the average rate of 
approvals of decisions of regional commercial courts during appeals in higher-jurisdiction 
commercial courts between 1995 and 2002.6 Shvets (2005) argues that it is well known that higher-
level commercial courts are comprised of much better skilled, motivated, and career-oriented judges. 
Thus, the rulings of the higher-jurisdiction judges have much lower probability of either being 
                                                 
6 Unlike other explanatory variables, J partly is measured after the 1998 law got in force. Yet, bankruptcy cases are a 
tiny share of all the cases considered in the commercial courts, so we do not expect to have any problem with reverse 
causality. 
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biased or erroneous due to a simple mistake. (The reason why this is not a panacea for Russian 
judicial system to appeal to the higher-level court is that only a very small share of cases goes 
through the higher-jurisdiction commercial courts due to very long delays in consideration and other 
technical barriers for appeal.) Thus, J measures the average share of correct rulings by regional-level 
judges. The faulty rulings may, of course, be both due to simple errors (in which case, the variable 
picks up the level of judicial skills) and deliberate biases of the regional-level judiciary (in which 
case the variable picks up judicial independence). If the average approval rate is high, the judicial 
biases are small and courts do not make many random mistakes. 
If bankruptcy courts are biased toward regional political authorities, our measure of judicial 
quality should negatively affect the likelihood that a firm goes into reorganization, since the higher 
the average approval rate, the smaller the court bias. The same logic suggests that the number of 
liquidations should decrease when judicial quality increases, since governors are not interested in 
liquidation. If, in contrast, courts are biased toward the coalition of the federal government and 
Moscow banks, then an increase in judicial quality might have a positive effect on both 
reorganizations and liquidations, since the federal government and Moscow-based banks may or 
may not want to liquidate a distressed firm as their first choice depending on its main objectives. 
The federal government may prefer reorganization for political reasons and the banks may also 
prefer reorganization for financial reasons if the industry is liquidity-constrained. Reorganization 
would probably imply a management change, as required by the bankruptcy law. We expect the law 
to be enforced in this case because courts are biased in the federal government’s favor.  Finally, if 
courts are independent, judicial quality may have an ambiguous effect on creditors’ passivity (and 
thus on the likelihood of reorganization / liquidation) depending on how risk-averse or risk-loving 
creditors are.7 
We estimate the Multinomial Logit regression model on the cross-section of firms. The 
dependent variable is the probability that a firm, given its characteristics before the adoption of the 
1998 law, (1) falls into an reorganization procedure, (2) is liquidated, or (3) is unaffected by 
bankruptcy during a year and a half after the introduction of the new law. We look at ex ante 
characteristics of firms to avoid endogeneity and rule out any reciprocal effects of bankruptcy onto 
firm characteristics. Our sample consists of 7,815 firms that are drawn from the intersection of 
RERLD, ALBA, and regional data sets for 1997. 
                                                 
7 As we would expect in the case of a regional bias in commercial courts, there is a negative correlation (of -0.17) 
between governor popularity and regional judicial quality. Federal-regional hostility and regional judicial quality are 
weakly positively correlated. Figure A1 in appendix presents non-parametric relationships between our main 
explanatory variables. 
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The estimated equation is as follows: 
)JHP(F]jBPr[ ii4i3i2i1i ε+β+β+β+β== X        (1) 
where i identifies a firm in the sample. Bi is an outcome after the introduction of the new law: it is 
equal to one of the three following outcomes for each firm in 1998 and the first half of 1999: 0 - 
bankruptcy procedure was not initiated (comparison group), 1- reorganization procedure was 
initiated, and 2- liquidation procedure was initiated. F is a logistic function.  
The following variables are used as controls. First, we control for the firm-level 
characteristics that influence the probability that firm ends up in bankruptcy: leverage ratio (log 
debt-to-assets ratio), coefficient of current liquidity (log ratio of liquid assets to short term 
liabilities), log cost per unit of output, log labor productivity, log labor productivity growth, log of 
official employment, and three-digit industry dummies. Firm-level controls are necessary to analyze 
the effect of regional characteristics of firms that, otherwise, would have similar prospects in 
bankruptcy. Second, we control for gross regional product per capita. This is an important control 
because political characteristics of the regions that we are interested in may be correlated with the 
regional economic development, which, in turn, may affect the number of regional bankruptcy 
procedures. All control variables are measured in 1997, before the introduction of the new law. 
Table 1A (see Appendix) presents summary statistics for the variables used in the regression 
analysis. We correct the standard error for heteroskedastisity and clusters of iε  within combinations 
of the regions and two-digit industries (Krishnaiah and Rao, 1994). 
Table 3 presents the regression results. We report both the coefficients of the Multinomial 
Logit regression and marginal effects evaluated at the mean levels of independent variables for the 
reorganization and liquidation outcomes, holding no bankruptcy as the comparison group.   
The hypothesis of a regional bias finds support in the data. As predicted, controlling for firm-
level characteristics, the probability of the reorganization procedure initiated against a firm in a 
region after the enactment of the 1998 bankruptcy law was positively significantly associated with 
the political popularity of the regional governor (which makes it easier for him to extend his 
influence on courts), with the extent of regional hostility towards the federal center (which makes it 
less politically costly for the governor to oppose the federal center), and with the extent of 
deficiencies in regional commercial courts. The probability of a liquidation procedure is unaffected 
by the governor’s popularity or judicial quality but is negatively and significantly related to a higher 
degree of hostility in political relations between the region and the federal center. This is consistent 
with our assumption that the primary motivation for the federal government is fiscal, and thus it 
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would like to liquidate inefficient firms; while the politically-motivated regional government wants 
to keep the firms in operation. These results are very robust: they do not depend on a particular 
specification or a particular set of covariates. 
The economic significance of these results is as follows. A one standard deviation increase in 
the measure of governor's popularity leads to a 2.88% increase in the predicted probability that an 
average firm ends up in reorganization procedure. In addition, a one standard deviation increase in 
the regional hostility towards the federal center is associated with a 4.91% increase in the predicted 
probability of a reorganization procedure. The numbers are based on predicted probability of 
reorganization that is evaluated at the mean value of employment for firms under reorganization 
procedure and overall means for all other independent variables. (It is equal to 1.71%.) In addition, a 
one standard deviation increase in judicial quality leads to a 4.31% decrease in the probability of 
reorganization. 
In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in the regional hostility towards the federal 
center decreases the probability that an average firm ends up in liquidation by 9.02% of the 
predicted probability of this outcome. This predicted probability is evaluated at the mean value of 
employment for firms that are being liquidated and overall means for all the other covariates, which 
is equal to 0.03%. The numbers are rather small, as most firms in the sample have been unaffected 
by bankruptcy. 
Signs of the coefficients of control variables are also as expected: low levels of current 
liquidity and labor productivity significantly increase the probability of both bankruptcy procedures. 
As predicted by political economy models, in which politicians and judges care about employment, 
we find that firms that end up in liquidation are significantly smaller than average. The size of firms 
that end up in reorganization procedure is, however, above the size of firms that are unaffected by 
bankruptcy. This is consistent with our basic story because the regional governments are more likely 
to use reorganization procedure to protect large rather than small firms from the federal government 
and creditors. 
If bankruptcy were politically independent, regional political variables should have no effect 
on the probability of bankruptcy procedures unless these variables were correlated with the regional 
economic distress and we did control for this properly. In this case, however, regional political 
variables should have had the same effect on the probability of both bankruptcy procedures. In 
contrast, we find the opposite effects of regional political variables on the probability of 
reorganization and liquidation procedures holding firm characteristics constant. The governor's 
political strength and hostility towards the center do not seem to correlate with the regional 
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economic distress. The correlation coefficients of these variables with various available measures of 
the regional economic well-being (for instance, per capita growth, index of resource potential, ratio 
of per capita income to subsistence level, etc.) are small, positive, and insignificant. 
 
3.3. Did reorganization procedures induce restructuring in bankrupt firms? 
In this section, we investigate three issues: First, we test whether firms, which found 
themselves in reorganization procedures after the enactment of the 1998 Bankruptcy Law, 
restructured as they were supposed to do, or did not restructure as our story of subverted 
bankruptcies suggests. On average, we should not observe any restructuring following the initiation 
of reorganization procedures, as these were initiated primarily in order to protect firms from paying 
federal taxes and overdue debt, rather than reorganize.  
Second, we test whether restructuring efforts for firms under the reorganization procedures 
vary with judicial quality. Poor judicial quality means a higher scope for influence over court 
decisions. Thus, our prediction is that one should observe relatively less restructuring in firms in 
reorganization if the court quality is poor.  
Third, judicial bias towards regional governors would be particularly strong if the political 
popularity of the governor is high and the quality of courts is poor. Thus, we expect a stronger effect 
of poor judicial quality on restructuring in bankruptcy in the regions with popular governors. We 
test whether data supports this prediction. 
We compare several performance measures in similar firms belonging to two groups: 1) a 
group of firms that started reorganization procedure in 1998 and 2) a control group. The control 
group is comprised of two firms (if they exist) for each firm in reorganization. The two firms are 
chosen from the same five-digit industry as the firm in reorganization, such that they are the closest 
to the firm in size (one smaller, and another one larger).  
We use the following three proxies for restructuring: log change in sales, log change in labor 
productivity, and log number of new product varieties between 1998 and 1999. We run OLS 
regressions for each of these proxies on the dummy indicating reorganization procedure and the 
interaction of the reorganization dummy with judicial quality as well as the triple interaction term of 
reorganization, judicial quality, and governor’s popularity.  
We estimate the following two equations: 
ii4i3ii2i1i J)JJ(RRY ε+β+β+−β+β= X      and        (2) 
ii8ii7ii6i5i4iii3ii2i1i PJ)PP(RPJ)PP)(JJ(R)JJ(RRY ε+β+β+−β+β+β+−−β+−β+β= X     (3) 
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where i indexes firms, Y stands for one of the three measure of enterprise restructuring, R is the 
dummy indicating firms under reorganization proceedings, J and P indicate our two regional 
variables of interest: judicial quality and governor’s popularity, respectively. Thus, we estimate the 
effect of judicial quality on restructuring inside bankruptcy procedure using difference-in-
differences estimator (equation 2) and the effect of political popularity – using difference-in-
differences-in-differences estimator (equation 3). It is important to note that the crucial underlying 
assumption for the validity of our estimation strategy is that in the absence of cross-regional 
differences in institutional environment (i.e., judicial quality and political popularity of the 
governor) the growth rates of sales and labor productivity of firms in bankruptcy and not in 
bankruptcy would have differed by a constant factor conditional on control variables X and would 
not have been related to judicial quality. 
We subtract sample means from each of the variables in all of the interaction terms in order 
to make interpretation of β1 straightforward: it is equal to the full effect of reorganization on 
restructuring evaluated at the mean values of J and P.  β1  in both equations, β2 in equation (2) and β3 
in equation (3) are our main parameters of interest. β2 in equation (1) estimates how restructuring in 
reorganization proceedings depends on judicial quality, whereas, the coefficient on the triple 
interaction term, β3 in equation (3), estimates whether the latter effect is influenced by the political 
popularity of the governor.   
Error terms are assumed to cluster at the regional level. Xi is a vector of control variables, 
which includes three-digit industry dummies, logs of sales and of employment in 1997, and log 
change in the stock of the outside finance taken from the firm’s balance sheet in 1998-1999. The 
latter covariate is included to control for a firm’s ability to raise outside finance, which is different 
for firms in and outside bankruptcy and can directly influence their performance. The number of 
firms that started reorganization procedure in 1998, for which we have all required data, is 115. The 
resulting sample consists of 319 to 336 firms, depending on the number of missing observations for 
some covariates. 
Table 4 presents the regression results, which are as follows: First, as we have hypothesized, 
at the mean level of regional characteristics, reorganization procedure has no effect on any of the 
restructuring measures; namely, there is no difference in restructuring for firms in and outside 
bankruptcy. (None of the coefficients of the reorganization dummy is statistically significant, and 
their magnitude is rather small.) 
Second, as predicted, judicial quality has an important effect on restructuring in bankruptcy: 
firms under reorganization proceedings restructure significantly more that firms outside bankruptcy 
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in regions with a high quality of the judiciary and restructure significantly less in regions with a low 
quality of the judiciary. The cross-term of reorganization dummy and judicial quality has positive 
and for two out of the three measures of restructuring statistically significant effect.  At the level of 
judicial quality one half of the standard deviation below the mean, firms under reorganization 
proceedings have 8% lower growth in sales and 16% lower number of new product varieties 
compared to similar firms outside bankruptcy.  In contrast, at the level of judicial quality one half of 
the standard deviation above the mean, firms under reorganization proceedings have 8% higher 
growth in sales and only 4% lower growth in product varieties compared to similar firms outside 
bankruptcy. Thus, judicial quality is crucial to enforcing restructuring of bankrupt firms.  
Third, the coefficient on the triple interaction between reorganization, judicial quality and 
political popularity of the governors has the right sign and is significant for two out of three 
measures of restructuring, i.e., sales and productivity growth.  Thus, we also find support for our 
hypothesis that politically powerful governors adversely affected the outcomes of reorganization 
proceedings in regions with poor judicial quality.  
Overall, we found strong support for our main hypotheses.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The application and enforcement of 1998 Bankruptcy Law in Russia vividly demonstrates 
that commercial court judges were biased in favor of politically popular regional governors. 
Reorganization proceedings were significantly more frequent in the regions with politically popular 
governors and governors who had hostile relations with the federal government. Poor judicial 
quality was also associated with higher incidence of reorganizations. Moreover, the quality of the 
regional judiciary affected performance of firms in reorganization: in the regions with poor judicial 
quality firms in reorganization underperformed relative to firms not in bankruptcy, while the 
opposite was true for the regions with high-quality judges. This effect is stronger in the regions with 
popular governors where the bias in governor’s favor in courts of poor quality is the strongest. 
The political influence of regional governors had transformed bankruptcy into the 
mechanism that allowed large firms to leave outside claim holders unsatisfied. In particular, the 
federal government (the largest claim holder on Russian firms) had no effective legal mechanism for 
collecting tax arrears. The weak and dependent judiciary played a crucial role in this story: The law 
gave judges substantial discretion over decisions on the fate of insolvent firms (while the rationale 
was to avoid inefficient liquidations).  This discretion was exploited by politically strong regional 
governors, who had influence over the regional judiciary. Our analysis suggests that it may be 
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worthwhile to give up some sophisticated features of the law, including judges' discretion, in order 
to secure implementation of its basic objectives. This is in line with the conclusions of the World 
Bank’s Doing Business report (2005), which shows that judicial discretion leads to inferior 
outcomes in countries with weak institutions. 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of bank credit to firms before and after the enactment of the bankruptcy law of 
1998. (Position of vertical axis indicated the date of enactment.) 
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Table 1. Initiation of bankruptcy procedures 
 Proceedings initiated: 
Year total excluding proceeding against 
absent debtors 
1993 <100 n/a 
1994 240 n/a 
1995 1 108 n/a 
1996 2 618 n/a 
1997 4 320 n/a 
1998 8 337 4 893 
1999 10 933 5 940 
2000 19 041 7 959 
2001 56 920 8 538 
Source: Higher Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation 
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Table 2.  Firms under different bankruptcy proceedings compared to the population of firms 
 Firms that fell into 
reorganization 
proceedings in 
1998 
Firms that fell into 
liquidation 
proceedings in 
1998 
Population of 
firms 
 
Significant 
difference 
b/w R & L 
at 5% level 
Median Mean 
(SE) 
Median Mean 
(SE) 
Median Mean 
(SE) 
Employment (persons), 
1997 
Y 796 2,027 
(202) 
240 472 
(45) 
143 489 
(11) 
Sales (Rb.), 1997 Y 18,471 225,491 
(50,562) 
3,282 14,620 
(4,785) 
4,516 44,692 
(3,806) 
Cost per ruble of output 
(Rb.), 1997 
Y 112 143 
(7) 
135 206 
(45) 
97 117 
(0.97) 
Labor productivity 
(Rb./employee), 1997 
Y 
 
27 58 
(6) 
15 21 
(2) 
37 58 
(62) 
Labor productivity 
growth (%), 1996-1997 
Y -17 -18 
(2) 
-29 -25 
(3) 
-5 -4 
(34) 
Balance sheet net profit 
(Rb.), 1997 
N -287 -4,349    
(2,042) 
-297 -3,935    
(962) 
11 3,334 
(437) 
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Table 3. Initiation of bankruptcy procedures and ex ante firm characteristics: Multinomial Logit estimation 
Probability of reorganization (1) or liquidation (2) procedure in a firm in 1998-99 compared to outcome of no bankruptcy (0): 
 Reorganization   Liquidation  
  Coefficient   dP(1)/dx     Coefficient  dP(2)/dx   
0.98  0.00282   -0.533  -0.00008   Regional political popularity of the 
governor [0.500]*  [0.00143]**   [0.552]  [0.00009]   
0.214  0.00062   -0.173  -0.00002   Regional hostility towards the center, 97 
[0.071]***  [0.00023]***   [0.074]**  [0.00001]*   
Regional judicial quality, 95-02 -3.052  -0.00878   0.013  0.00000   
  [1.182]***  [0.00376]**   [1.098]  [0.00016]   
Firm's leverage ratio, 97 0.103  0.0003   0.136  0.00002   
  [0.072]  [0.00021]   [0.060]**  [0.00001]*   
Firm's current liquidity, 97 -2.097  -0.00603   -3.95  -0.00056   
  [0.244]***  [0.00067]***   [0.436]***  [0.00018]***   
Firm's log cost per unit of output, 97 0.092  0.00026   0.028  0.00000   
  [0.208]  [0.00060]   [0.176]  [0.00003]   
Firm's log labor productivity, 97 -0.308  -0.00089   -0.504  -0.00007   
  [0.113]***  [0.00036]**   [0.112]***  [0.00003]**   
0.047  0.00013   -0.062  -0.00001   Firm's log labor productivity growth, 96-97 
[0.154]  [0.00045]   [0.079]  [0.00001]   
Firm's log enterprise employment, 97 0.775  0.00223   -0.25  -0.00004   
  [0.069]***  [0.00036]***   [0.104]**  [0.00002]**   
Log gross regional product per capita, 97 0.005  0.00002   -0.004  0.00000   
  [0.236]  [0.00068]   [0.255]  [0.00004]   
3-digit industry dummies included YES   YES      YES   YES    
Frequency of the outcome      2.79%        2.34%   
Predicted probability     0.0063        0.00035   
Observations       7815          
Pseudo R-squared       0.36          
Note: Comparison group is no bankruptcy. Clusters for combination of 2-digit industry and region are allowed. Second column for each 
outcome reports marginal effects. (Marginal effects for all three outcomes sum to unity.) Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean values 
of independent variables. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4. Ex post restructuring and reorganization procedure: OLS 
  
Log 
change 
in sales, 
98-99 
Log change 
in labor 
productivity, 
98-99 
Log new 
product 
varieties, 
98-99 
Log 
change 
in sales, 
98-99 
Log change 
in labor 
productivity, 
98-99 
Log new 
product 
varieties, 
98-99 
Reorganization 0.006 0.056 -0.106 0.037 0.085 -0.087 
 [0.089] [0.076] [0.070] [0.094] [0.076] [0.072] 
Judicial quality  -0.593 -0.910* -0.401 -0.594 -0.896* -0.405 
 [0.662] [0.532] [0.632] [0.646] [0.515] [0.691] 
Judicial qualityD * Reorganization 2.004* 1.392 1.408* 1.658 1.108 1.263 
 [1.178] [0.893] [0.790] [1.045] [0.895] [0.881] 
Judicial qualityD * Reorganization * Political popularityD   13.100* 11.761* 6.441 
    [7.727] [6.202] [6.056] 
Political popularity    -0.135 -0.052 0.035 
    [0.295] [0.268] [0.245] 
Political popularityD * Reorganization    0.13 0.051 -0.029 
    [0.560] [0.428] [0.350] 
Judicial quality * Political popularity    -0.037 -3.072 -7.112 
    [5.045] [4.364] [5.130] 
Log sales, 97 -0.079 -0.099** -0.113*** -0.072 -0.097** -0.121*** 
 [0.053] [0.040] [0.041] [0.052] [0.041] [0.041] 
Log employment, 97 0.051 0.093 0.354*** 0.047 0.094 0.367*** 
 [0.091] [0.065] [0.066] [0.090] [0.065] [0.065] 
Log outside finance, 98-99 0.117*** 0.099*** 0.001 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.004 
 [0.026] [0.025] [0.022] [0.025] [0.024] [0.023] 
3-digit industry dummies YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
Observations 336 336 320 335 335 319 
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.3 0.24 0.24 0.31 
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the regions in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Coefficients at “Reorganization” show the full marginal effect of reorganization procedure on restructuring evaluated at 
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the mean values of governor’s political popularity and judicial quality because before taking the cross-terms we subtract means from these 
variables (this is indicated by the superscript “D”). 
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APPENDIX: 
Table 1A. Summary statistics for variables used in regression analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ex-ante firm characteristics regression:           
Outcome (0-no bankruptcy; 1-reorganization; 2-
liquidation) 7815 0.0756 0.3428 0 2
Regional political popularity of the governor, 
before 98 7815 0.5205 0.1745 0.166 0.9454
Regional hostility towards the center, 97 7815 2.6828 1.353 1 5
Regional judicial quality, 95-02 7815 0.8065 0.084 0.3333 0.9639
Firm's leverage ratio, 97 7815 0.5109 0.7602 0.02 14.7466
Firm's current liquidity, 97 7815 1.2119 1.277 0.0072 38.3556
Firm's Log cost per unit of output, 97 7815 4.6938 0.4452 1.1314 10.8422
Firm's log labor productivity, 97 7815 3.7405 1.2975 -5.9135 9.4803
Firm's log labor productivity growth, 96-97 7815 0.0599 0.653 -24 6.035
Firm's log enterprise employment, 97 7815 5.647 1.3942 0 11.4057
Log gross regional product per capita, 97 7815 9.4984 0.4259 8.5423 11.0892
            
Ex-post restructuring regressions:           
Dummy for reorganization 337 0.3442 0.4758 0 1
Log change in sales, 98-99 337 0.0333 0.7748 -3.93 2.4878
Log change in labor productivity 98-99 337 0.1035 0.6623 -2.907 2.6042
Log new product varieties, 98-99 321 0.5343 0.633 0 2.7726
Log output, 97 337 5.5734 2.1299 -2.8944 10.9948
Log employment, 97 337 6.6602 1.3619 1.6094 10.1598
Log outside finance, 98-99 337 -1.4205 1.9547 -8.7501 2.8258
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Figure A1. Non-parametric relationship between regional judicial quality, on the one hand, and governor’s hostility towards the federal 
center and governor’s political popularity, on the other hand 
 
Note: The line in each graph represents that lowess smother. 
